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Abstract 
Under the U.S. Department of Commerce’s ‘changed circumstances’ review, it is 
possible that the countervail duty on Canadian lumber can be lowered if administered 
stumpage prices are based on transaction evidence appraisal – on actual auction data and 
regression analysis. The Province of British Columbia is implementing such a market-
based approach to set stumpage fees, relying on timber auction data from the Small 
Business Forest Enterprise Program (SBFEP) and OLS regression. We employ SBFEP 
data to estimate a truncated regression model, comparing our estimates of stumpage fees 
with the OLS results. It turns out that the OLS approach is biased and likely results in 
overestimates of stumpage in some timber stands and underestimates in others. Further, 
we demonstrate that number of bidders has an important impact on bids, but that this 
could create even more problems for resolving the trade dispute. 
 
Key words:  Canada-U.S. softwood lumber trade; truncated regression; timber 
auctions; public ownership of forestland 
  3ARE LOG MARKETS COMPETITIVE? EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE AND 
IMPLICATIONS FOR CANADA-U.S. TRADE IN SOFTWOOD LUMBER 
 
Canadian exports of softwood lumber have long been subject to various trade 
restrictions at different times. In January 2003, the U.S. Department of Commerce (DOC) 
released a proposed framework for analyzing ‘changed circumstance’ reviews for the 
countervail (18.8%) and anti-dumping (8.43%) duties imposed on softwood lumber from 
Canada (U.S. DOC).
1 The report stressed that provincially administered stumpage fees in 
Canada need to be established using a ‘market-based system’, which it defined as one 
that “produces results consistent with those the province could expect from the sale of all 
its standing timber at open auction”. In translating auction results to administered 
stumpage fees, the DOC stated that it has a “strong preference for regression analysis”.  
The regression analysis approach to stumpage appraisal is a form of Transaction 
Evidence Appraisal (TEA). The use of regression analysis to predict stumpage rates 
originates with Steer and Guttenberg, who used multiple regression analysis to relate 
timber stand characteristics to stumpage values. Over time, regression analysis was used 
not only to relate timber stand characteristics to stumpage value, but also to examine the 
effect of competition and auction design on bids (Mead, Schniepp and Watson 1983; 
Johnson; Brannman). The U.S. Forest Service also began to use TEA as an alternative to 
complex residual value calculations in setting reserve prices for timber sales from 
National Forests.  
In British Columbia, the Provincial government owns 96% of forestland. The 
Ministry of Forests (MoF) adopted a TEA system when it developed the Market Pricing 
System (MPS) in 1999 for both the Coast and the Interior regions (BC MoF 1999). The MPS was used to appraise timber sales under the Small Business Forest Enterprise 
Program (SBFEP), which was composed of two main types of timber sales: (1) ‘Section 
20’ timber sales were awarded via a sealed bid procedure to the highest bidder. (2) 
‘Section 21’ sales were awarded on the basis of the contribution to local manufacturing 
and employment as well as revenue. Since the SBFEP made up less than 10% of the 
provincial harvest, the amount of timber transacted was relatively small. This changed 
when the Forestry Revitalization Plan proposed the widespread adoption of a new MPS 
(BC MoF 2003).  
The new plan calls for the elimination of section 21 sales, with that volume to be 
diverted to section 20 and administered under a new entity called British Columbia 
Timber Sales. Additionally, major licensees with various forms of long-term timber 
harvesting rights will have 20% of their annual harvest taken back.
2 Approximately half 
of this ‘take back’ volume is to be added to the amount of volume sold at auction. All of 
the auction volume will use the MPS system as a method for determining upset stumpage 
rates in the same fashion as before – as 70% of the high bid predicted by the MPS.  
As a means of getting at the DOC’s ‘changed circumstance’, the plan proposes to 
use the MPS to set stumpage fees on the remaining harvest by tenure holders. This 
represents a major shift in the use of the MPS. Given that long-term tenure holders 
(licensees) have different forest management obligations than harvesters of auctioned 
timber, the MPS will have to be adjusted accordingly. Forest management obligations 
include activities both prior to and after harvesting. Prior to harvesting the licensees are 
responsible for preparing various forest development plans, laying out the harvesting 
units and conducting a timber cruise. Once harvesting is complete, the units must be 
  2reforested; when the newly established stand has reached a ‘free to grow’ state, the 
licensee has no further obligations. The rate predicted by the MPS must therefore be 
discounted by appraised allowances reflecting these additional costs and responsibilities.  
Further, when using the MPS to set administered timber prices, it is important to 
ensure proper model specification and accurate predictions. There are negative 
consequences when a mis-specified model is used to set upset prices or stumpage fees for 
major licensees. For example, an upset price set too high can result in no bidders, while 
upset prices set too low in the face of imperfect competition may result in excessive bid 
shading. A mis-specified model used for administering stumpage rates to the majority of 
the provincial harvest can potentially have widespread perverse effects. Inaccurate 
predictions affect both economic efficiency and equity. If the model overvalues certain 
stands and/or undervalues others, harvesting patterns are likely to be distorted. If such 
distortions persist in certain areas, some licensees could be unfairly advantaged or 
disadvantaged.  
Previous MPS models used Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression techniques 
based on observed high bids from historical section 20 timber sales (BC MoF 1999). 
Section 20 sales are auctioned using a first-price, sealed bid procedure with an announced 
reservation or upset price. In some cases, therefore, there are no bids on timber sales, 
because buyers’ maximum willingness to pay is below the upset price. These cases are 
not included in the MPS model because observations on the dependent variable are 
missing. Yet, the characteristics of no-bid timber sales are known.  
As Huang and Buongiorno argued, the fact that timber went unsold is important 
market information that should be included in a TEA model. They employed a censored 
  3or tobit regression model (Tobin), because they had information on bids that were not 
accepted. Estimation of the censored model by OLS is inappropriate and model 
parameters need to be estimated using maximum likelihood.  
The treatment of variables related to competition also needs to be addressed at the 
time of model specification and when using the model for prediction. Central to this idea 
is the treatment of the number of bidders, because one usually has data only on the actual 
numbers of bidders. In a sealed-bid auction, participants will not know the number of 
bidders, but will base their bid on expected or potential competition (Brannman). 
Consequently, Carter and Newman specified a two-equation timber sale model, a bid 
equation and an expected number of bidders equation. Including the number of bidders 
(and other competition related variables) improves the model’s fit and leads to more 
accurate predictions. However, a TEA model used to set administered prices should not 
validate non-competitive results, because market power is then carried beyond the 
auction into the larger set of non-auctioned timber harvesting units.  
In this paper, we desire is to predict the ‘fair market value’ of standing timber in 
British Columbia using a truncated as opposed to censored regression because we do not 
have sufficient information on timber sales that did not go through. We only know that 
there were no bids on a particular sale because the reservation price was presumably too 
high, but we do not have any other information on the no-bid sale. We consider which of 
several predicted values is appropriate in setting stumpage fees for non-auctioned timber. 
We also examine methods to control for variables reflecting competition when making 
predictions. For the empirical analysis, we use timber sale data from the Interior of 
British Columbia.  
  4STRATEGIC BIDDING AND COMPETITION: THEORY 
Using an independent private values framework, McAfee and McMillan derive 
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where V is a bidder’s true valuation, u is the upset price and n is the number of bidders. 
Equation (1) predicts that bidders will shade their bid from their true valuation by an 
amount represented by the second term in the equation, which represents the bidder’s best 
guess regarding the difference between her valuation and that of the next highest bidder. 
Assuming everyone follows this strategy, the average winning bid in a first-price sealed 
bid auction will be the second-highest valuation (Riley and Samuelson).  
The bid shading term is a function of the number of bidders and the upset price. 
As  n increases, bid shading decreases and bids approach their true value, but at a 
decreasing rate (Mead, Schniepp and Watson 1981; Johnson; Sendak). Brannman, Klein 
and Weiss conducted a more comprehensive analysis of this relationship by assigning a 
dummy variable to each number of bidders category; they assigned separate dummy 
variables for each of n=1, n=2, …, n=11, with the category n≥12 excluded to avoid the 
dummy variable trap. The estimated coefficients on the dummy variables for each 
number of bidders category were consistent with equation (1), increasing at a decreasing 
rate from highly negative and statistically significant for sales with one bidder to the 
point where they were not statistically significantly different from zero with 12 or more 
bidders. Assuming that auctions with 12 or more bidders are competitive with bids 
  5representing true valuations, the coefficients on the dummy variables can be interpreted 
as the bid shading term in equation (1). In this fashion, it is possible to predict the high 
bid for standing timber in the absence of bid shading – the best estimate of the high 
bidder’s true valuation (V) for the timber. 
The aforementioned studies all used the actual number of bidders in the timber 
sale model. However, with a sealed-bid timber sale, the actual number of bidders is not 
known a priori, so bids should be based instead on the expected or potential number of 
bidders (Brannman). Furthermore, since the primary use of many models is as a 
predictive tool and the actual number of bidders is an ex-post value, what does one use 
for ex-ante prediction? For prediction, it is necessary to make the number of bidders 
endogenous as well.  
Schuster and Niccolucci were the first to use various timber sale characteristics to 
predict the number of bidders and enter its expected number in the bid equation. 
However, Carter and Newman provided a richer model that is more consistent with 
auction theory. Their motivation for treating the number of bidders as endogenous comes 
mostly from the Common Values auction paradigm, which shows that the number of 
potential bidders decreases with increasing pre-sale measurement costs and rises with 
increasing sale value. From the potential number of bidders, the actual number of bidders 
is determined strictly by the reserve price in the auction. The two equations can be 
written as: 
 
(2)  B = f[E(nA), u, Vmax(X1)] 
(3)  nA = g[u, nP(E(B), X2)]  
  6where nA is the actual number of bidders, nP is the number of potential bidders, u is the 
upset or reserve price, Vmax is the highest valuation, X1 is a vector of variables that 
determines the valuation, and X2 is a set of explanatory variables that determines the 
number of potential bidders. 
In the models of Schuster and Niccolucci, and Carter and Newman, an 
explanatory variable can be significant in both the bid equation and the number of bidders 
equation. The explanatory variable will then have a direct effect on the bid and an 
indirect effect through its influence on the number of bidders. Isolating these two effects 
can help solve the dilemma faced by Nelson et al. who, in their model of timber sales for 
the Interior of British Columbia, noted that observed negative coefficients on the regional 
dummy variables may be partly due to reduced competition in the area and partly the 
result of legitimately lower valuations associated with things like higher local operating 
costs. The two effects that a regional dummy variable has on a bid can then be interpreted 
with equation (1) in mind. The direct effect reveals the high bidders’ true valuations for 
the resource and the indirect effect reveals the degree to which bids are shaded from that 
valuation. 
REGRESSION MODELS 
The High Bid (B) for standing timber is specified as the following linear relation:  
(4)  Bi = β'Xi + εi 
where Xi is a vector of exogenous timber sale characteristics, β is a vector of parameters 
to be estimated and εi is an error term that represents factors not explicitly included in the 
model. The dependent variable is unobserved when it is below the upset stumpage rate. 
  7Therefore, B is a latent variable that is observed only when it is at least equal to the upset 
price. The true linear relationship is much steeper than that predicted by an OLS 
regression model that ignores bids below the upset price (no-bid slaes) – the OLS 
estimators are biased with the degree of bias directly related to the number of excluded 
observations. Given that the dependent variable on the no-bid timber sale is unobserved, 
how does one fit the regression line? The answer to this question depends on the 
information one has on the timber sales. If both the dependent and explanatory variables 
of the model are unknown for such ‘sales’, a truncated regression model is appropriate; 
however, if one has information on the explanatory variables but not the dependent 
variable, a censored regression model should be used (Greene, p.896).  
We are unaware of studies of timber sales that use the truncated model, although 
several employ a censored model (Huang and Buongiorno; Sendak; Carter and Newman). 
Since we do not have data on bids below the upset price, we employ a truncated 
regression model, which can be written as:  
(5)  Bi|Bi>ui = E[Bi|Bi>ui] + ei = β'Xi + E[єi|Bi>ui] + ei,  
where ui is the upset price for timber sale i and ei is an error term with mean zero. 
Assuming normality,  
(6)  E[єi|Bi>ui] = σλ(αi), 
where αi = [(ui–β'Xi)/σ], λ(αi) = ø(αi)/[1–Φ(αi)] is the inverse mills ratio (also referred to 
as Heckman’s λ), ø(αi) is the standard normal density function, Φ(αi) is the standard 
normal cumulative distribution function, and σ is the standard deviation of Xβ. Given that 
Bi|Bi>ui is the observed high bid from the auction, the model can also be written as: 
  8(7)  yi = β 'Xi + σλ(αi) + ei, 
where yi is the observed high bid in the auction. 
In the past, Heckman’s two-step method was used to address and correct sample 
selectivity bias. In the first step, a probit model with observed bids assigned a value of 
one and no-bid sales a value of zero is used to estimate the inverse mills ratio. In the 
second step, the observed bid is regressed on the explanatory variables, which include the 
estimated inverse mills ratio from the first step, using OLS. This procedure can only be 
used if there is information on the no-bid sales. Since Heckman’s approach is not as 
efficient as maximum likelihood estimation (Paarsch; Nelson) and we have no 
information on no-bid sales, ML estimation is required. The likelihood function is: 
(8)  () [] ( ) [ ] /σ 'i i ø σ 1 /σ 'i
1 Φ β X β X − − − − =∏ y u L i , for Bi≥ui. 
Parameters β and σ are found by maximizing the likelihood function (8). 
For the simultaneous model, a two-stage approach developed by Nelson and 
Olson and employed by Carter and Newman can be used to yield consistent estimates. 
The first stage estimates the bid, E(B), and the expected number of bidders, E(nA), using 
the reduced-form equations. E(B) is estimated using a truncated model as there is no data 
on no-bid sales, and E(nA) is estimated using OLS. The second stage involves re-
estimating both equations using the predicted values estimated in the first stage.  
PREDICTION AND STUMPAGE APPRAISAL 
Assuming proper specification, the Tobit model yields unbiased and consistent 
estimates   and  . Consequently, one can predict the latent variable (B) using the fitted  β ˆ σ ˆ
  9linear relationship (X ). It is expected that this equation will not predict each bid 
exactly, but deviations above and below X  will cancel each other out resulting in an 
average deviation of zero and an average bid X . With the introduction of an upset rate, 
some of the high bids below the regression line will not be accepted, so errors from above 
the line are not cancelled by ones below the line, and the average error is now positive. 
The predicted or mean high bid conditional on the high bid being greater than the upset 
rate is now the linear relationship X  plus a positive average error, which is directly 
related to the location of the upset price relative to the predicted high bid (X ) and its 
standard deviation  . As the upset price is set increasingly higher, one would expect that 
more and more unacceptable high bids would occur, thus leaving an increasing 
proportion of errors above the line compared to below and resulting in an increasing 
average error and an increasing conditional high bid. The expected or average error is 
given by σλ( ), and the predicted conditional high bid is X + λ( ). The expected 
probability of a sale occurring is given by 1/λ, which increases as the upset price 
decreases. This increase in sale probability shrinks the inverse mills ratio and lowers the 
average error term causing less of a gap between the predicted high bid and the predicted 







ˆ α ˆ β ˆ σ ˆ α ˆ
If British Columbia continues its current policy of setting the upset price at 70% 
of the predicted high bid, the probability of sale increases as the predicted high bid 
increases. Therefore, as the predicted high bid increases, the gap between it and the 
conditional high bid decreases. The conditional high bid equation is therefore nonlinear. 
In Figure 1, the difference between the predicted and conditional high bids is shown for 
  10σ ˆ  = $7/m
3. The difference between the two predicted values ranges from about $0.8/m
3 




Previous researchers referred to the latent variable as the market value (Huang 
and Buongiono; Sendak; Carter and Newman; Boltz, Carter and Jacobson). Then the 
predicted market value would be equivalent to the predicted unconditional high bid. 
However, the term ‘market value’ may not be appropriate here given that the latent 
variable reflects only the buyer side of the market. Buyers’ willingness to pay and sellers’ 
willingness to accept determine a market value. If we use the predicted latent variable as 
a proxy for willingness to pay and the upset price as the sellers’ willingness to accept, the 
term market value is more appropriately assigned to the predicted conditional high bid.
3  
In addition, given the DOC’s demand that a system of administered prices is 
consistent with prices a “province could expect from the sale of all its standing timber at 
open auction” and the fact that the predicted conditional high bid is also the expected 
high bid one would observe, the predicted value of the conditional high bid may be a 
more appropriate stumpage fee to charge licensees who do not bid for timber from 
managed lands. Of course, this may be a moot point, as Figure 1 shows that the 
difference between the two predicted values for the current upset rate policy is rather 
small. Since the upset rate can significantly impact the conditional high bid, it will 
naturally receive some focus.  
There are three alternatives to setting upset rates. First, the process of calculating 
the conditional high bid admittedly adds complexity to prediction and the inverse mills 
ratio term may cause confusion. In order to address this issue, it may be desirable to set 
  11upset prices so that the difference between the expected values of the unconditional and 
conditional bids is constant from sale to sale. This would generate a more equitable, 
simple linear equation, as the nonlinear expected error term would just become part of the 
constant. This method is applicable only if the conditional high bid is the predictive value 
chosen to administer stumpage fees, and is appealing because it makes setting of 
administered prices simpler. However, it does not lend itself to the traditional purpose of 
upset prices, such as hedging against collusion and extracting the maximum economic 
rent for the owner of the resource.  
Second, the public agency may set upset prices to maximize the expected revenue 
it receives from timber sales. Carter and Newman note that increasing the upset price acts 
as a two-edged sword, increasing the conditional high bid while also increasing the 
probability of no sale and thus no revenue. Assuming that re-sale does not occur, the 
expected revenue (R) function is: 
(9)  E(R) = Prob[B > u] E[R| B > u] + Prob[B ≤ u] E[R| B ≤ u] 
Since E[R|B>u] = E[B|B>u] and E[R|B≤u] = 0, equation (9) can be re-written as: 
(10)  E(R) = Prob[B>u] E[B|B> u] = 1-Φ( ) [X  +  λ(α)]   α ˆ β ˆ σ ˆ ˆ
if normality is assumed. 
Maximizing (10) allows one to solve for the upset price u that maximizes 
expected revenue. Setting upset prices in this manner is more consistent with how a 
private firm would operate, which may help B.C.’s chances in a changed circumstance 
review. However, it can also be argued that this method results in the government 
exercising excessive market power. Under perfect competition, a seller would be willing 
  12to accept any price that exceeds the marginal cost of provision. To reflect this, upset 
prices would be set to ensure that the stumpage collected is greater than the costs incurred 
by the public agency to develop, offer and administer the timber sale. This ensures 
harvesting is within the extensive margin, and that the quantity of timber produced does 
not exceed that of a competitive market and therefore does not artificially deflate 
domestic and international prices (Nordhaus).  
Finally, under perfect competition, it is optimum for the auctioneer to set the 
upset price at zero (Carter and Newman). However, perfect competition is usually absent, 
so upset prices are necessary. In an administered setting, if one can model a competitive 
result then no conditions should be placed on the sale; therefore, the predicted 
competitive high bid V would be the market value. To model V one needs to isolate 
variables that are related to bid shading and remove them from the forecast: 
(11)  E(V) = E(B) + E(bid shading). 
The predicted value obtained from (11) addresses concerns over validating lack of 
competition in an administered stumpage system using TEA. It also gets around the 
complexities described earlier of calculating a conditional high bid. It can be argued that, 
in spite of a competitive market, conditions would still be placed on the sale to ensure 
costs to the seller are recovered. However, as noted earlier, most of the costs related to 
forest management and reforestation are the responsibility of the licensee. The authority 
still incurs some administrative, compliance, enforcement and other opportunity costs, 
but these can be recovered by setting an appropriate minimum stumpage. The stumpage 
rate charged to non-auctioned cutting authorities would therefore be the maximum of: 
  The predicted competitive high bid less appraised allowances for forest 
  13management planning and silviculture, or 
  The net opportunity cost incurred by the province as a result of harvesting.
4  
The appropriateness of this administered system is sure to be debated. Interpreting 
and quantifying what constitutes bid shading is sure to be contentious. Further, although 
V may be the highest valuation for the timber resource, it may not reflect the natural 
resource rent because, in some cases, quasi-rent attributable to human entrepreneurial 
innovation and investment may be collected. In order to provide the right incentives, 
those who are responsible for the innovation should enjoy its benefits. By collecting 
quasi-rents, incentives to invest and innovate are distorted. Schwindt also notes that a 
firm’s valuation of timber is a marginal value that is influenced by capacity levels. 
Therefore, the value of timber for a firm with excess capacity reflects not only the 
revenue it can receive from the conversion of the timber, but also the reduced unit costs 
that come about from increasing output. Consequently, charging a firm based on 
willingness to pay at the margin does not appropriately reflect the value of other inputs. 
These issues will likely continue to be debated if a TEA system is implemented.  
Nonetheless, the predicted competitive auction result does help to reveal the value 
of a forest tract for its timber properties and this can be a valuable piece of information 
for purposes other than determining administered stumpage fees. Resource managers will 
be able to make silvicultural investment decisions more efficiently and the full marginal 
opportunity cost of using forestland for purposes other than timber production can be 
established. Additionally, knowing this valuation will also benefit sellers who face 
imperfect competition, as it will aid in setting appropriate upset rates, although Bulow 
and Klemperer conclude that it is typically worth more to the seller to expand the market 
  14and attract more bidders than trying to set an optimal upset price. In reference to British 
Columbia, their conclusions support the idea of developing an appropriate competition 
policy that prevents unacceptable market concentration.  
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM THE INTERIOR OF BRITISH COLUMBIA
5  
The results of section 20 timber auctions in the B.C. Interior for the period 
January 1999 to August 2002 were used to estimate a TEA model. Regrettable bids 
where the timber sale was turned back were excluded, as were outliers and ‘suspicious’ 
values according to the MoF’s MPS data protocol. A total of 639 observations remained. 
A truncated model is used since the data contain no information on no-bid timber sales. 
Two versions of the truncated model were developed, differing in their treatment of the 
number of bidders. The first treats the actual number of bidders as exogenous and follows 
the methods outlined by Brannman, Klein and Weiss, while the second treats the number 
of bidders as endogenous.  
Consistent with residual value methods and auction theory, it is expected that 
variables influencing stumpage bids fall into one of three categories according to whether 
they affect (1) the selling price of products derived from standing timber, (2) the costs of 
converting standing timber into various higher valued wood products, or (3) the strategic 
bidding behavior of the buyers. Explanatory variables are provided in Table 1.  
In the exogenous-bidders model, only the actual number of bidders and the 
truncated upset price (upset price less one cent since the actual upset price would be 
acceptable) are thought to be category 3 variables. However, since previous MPS models 
were used to determine the upset price and most of the variables in this model were 
included in past MPS models, the inclusion of the truncated upset price is expected to 
  15result in multi-collinearity. Since competition is accounted for by the actual number of 
bidders, the expected negative coefficient(s) on northern forest districts are presumably 
attributed to some localized unidentified category 1 or 2 variable.  
In the endogenous-bidders model, the forecast number of bidders is a category 3 
variable, but it is determined by a subset of the other variables, some of which are 
regional dummy variables. The variables in this subset are hypothesized to affect the bid 
both directly (category 1 and 2) and indirectly through their influence on the forecast 
number of bidders (category 3). Therefore, the negative coefficient(s) expected in 
northern districts are partly attributed to localized selling price and operating cost factors, 
and partly to market concentration. The variables that help to explain the number of 
bidders, however, are not all associated with market concentration. As noted by the 
common values auction framework, in addition to the potential number of bidders, pre-
sale measurement costs and timber value determine the actual number of bidders. 
< Insert Table 1 about here> 
Exogenous Number of Bidders 
The numbers of bidders participating in an auction were assigned dummy 
variables, except sales with 11 or more bidders. Preliminary regression results confirmed 
the existence of multi-collinearity associated with the truncated upset price variable for 
reasons discussed above. When the truncated variable was included in the regression, the 
coefficients on the other variables took on unlikely magnitudes and the wrong signs, a 
classic symptom of multi-collinearity. An auxiliary regression was then performed where 
the other variables in the model were regressed on the truncated variable; as suspected the 
  16regression was highly significant. Consequently, the truncated upset price variable was 
dropped. The Southern Interior Forest Region was treated as a homogenous market, while 
the Northern Interior Region was divided into four zones.
6 The estimation results are 
provided in Table 1. 
With the exception of cruise volume, the 2
nd quarter sales dummy, proportion of 
gross volume of sale retained and whether the sale is a salvage sale or not, all category 1 
and 2 variables are statistically significant at the 0.10 level of confidence or better. The 
lack of statistical significance for salvage is somewhat surprising given that this wood is 
presumably of lower quality. Further, salvage material often gluts local markets, 
depressing prices (Prestemon, Pye and Holmes). One explanation for this result is the 
grading system used in the Interior. The timber bid is for sawlog grade logs only; all 
other grades are charged a flat fee of $0.25/m
3. This flat fee is likely an underestimate of 
the value of the fiber as salvage sales often contain significantly more non-sawlog grades. 
Bidders may therefore bid higher than market value on the sawlogs, knowing they are 
getting non-sawlogs at less than market value. If this phenomenon occurs on a large 
scale, and is not properly controlled for in the regression, it could potentially distort TEA 
results. With the large current Mountain Pine Beetle infestation in British Columbia, this 
may become a significant issue with future MPS models and may require changing the 
grading system.  
The results also indicate that, since the countervail duty (CVD), bids have 
dropped some $6.35/m
3. Under a market based pricing system and when faced with lower 
output values (e.g., due to a CVD), firms will adjust their input costs leaving output 
unchanged. Hence, if the goal of U.S. duties is to restrict the flow of wood into the 
  17domestic market, a price mechanism (import tax) is less likely to succeed than a quantity 
restriction (quota). 
The coefficient on development costs should, from a theory standpoint, equal one. 
Values less than one imply that appraised development costs are overestimates. Munn 
and Rucker, and Brannman, found evidence indicating that the ‘purchaser credit limit’ 
given to loggers on U.S. National Forests for road construction was too generous. 
However, the appraisal rate is based on an operator of ‘average efficiency’, and 
presumably the high bidder in a competitive auction is better than average. Furthermore, 
a value less than one may also be explained by the manner in which stumpage is charged 
on wood removed from the road right of way outside harvesting units. This timber is 
usually charged at district average rates; if bidders know this rate is too low, they will 
adjust their bids to reflect their net road building costs (cost of road building less the 
revenue obtained from the right-of-way wood). The appraised development costs do not 
take timber revenue from such wood into account. 
The most interesting results, however, pertain to the dummy variables on the 
number of bidders’ categories. The coefficients follow a pattern that match the 
theoretically optimum bid path of equation (1). Assuming sales that have 11 or more 
bidders are perfectly competitive, where bids represent true valuations, the regression 
results in Table 1 indicate that sales with less than eight bidders are subject to some type 
of bid shading. In auctions with eight or more bidders, however, the high bid is 
statistically not different from the highest valuation (V). If used for forecasting, the 
predicted high valuation for any given timber sale can be found by excluding the number 
of bidders component from the equation. To predict the expected bid, the estimated 
  18coefficient   would be multiplied by the estimated inverse mills ratio, λ(α),  and added 
to the equation.  The number of bidders variables would also remain in the equation, but 
since the actual number of bidders is only observed after the auction, the dilemma is to 
choose the appropriate number of bidders.  
σ ˆ ˆ
The coefficients on northern zones were negative as expected, although the 
estimated coefficient for South-central North was insignificant, suggesting that bids there 
do not differ from the Southern Interior Region. Given that competition is taken into 
account by the number of bidders, the negative values suggest that valuations in the 
North are legitimately lower, and appraisals should reflect this. However, northern 
markets are more concentrated so they are also expected to lower the bid. The 
endogenous bidders model should capture these relationships more fully. 
Endogenous Number of Bidders  
Regression results for the reduced-form bid and number of bidders equations are 
presented in Table 2, as are the results of the OLS reduced-form bid equation. A 
comparison of the maximum likelihood estimates from the truncated model with the OLS 
estimates confirms the anticipated bias of the latter estimates. The coefficients of the 
explanatory variables estimated by OLS are smaller and the intercept higher than the 
unbiased ML estimates. Further support for selectivity bias comes from the significance 
of the inverse mills ratio, λ(α).   ˆ
 
<Insert Table 2 about here> 
 
  19In the reduced-form bid equation, Fort Nelson, Far North and Central North are 
highly statistically significant with negative coefficients. Since these variables are also 
significant (Far North marginally significant) in the number of bidders equation, this 
suggests that lower bids in these zones are partly attributable to reduced competition. To 
quantify just how much the lower competition affects the bidding results, it is necessary 
to obtain the structural coefficients of the bid model. These are provided in Table 3. 
 
<Insert Table 3 about here> 
 
Reduced competition in the northern zones affects bids in the following manner: 
Fort Nelson: $-12.56/m³ (=12.185×-1.031); Far North: $-1.47/m³ (=12.185×-0.121); and 
Central North: $-2.64/m³ (=12.185×-0.217). If the Southern Interior (which is included in 
the intercept term) is assumed to have sufficient competition so bids approximately 
reflect true valuations, the above adjustments can be interpreted as the levels of bid 
shading. The level of bid shading for Fort Nelson corresponds closely with what one 
might expect given that there is only one significant manufacturer in this district. The 
nearest competitor is located in Fort St. John, approximately 380 km away. The amount 
by which the bid is shaded is bout equal to the transportation cost to the sawmill in Fort 
St. John.
7 This result is also consistent with the optimum bid strategy developed by 
McAfee and McMillan; bids reflect the bidder’s best guess as to what the next highest 
bidder’s valuation is.  
Bid shading in the Far North and Central North is rather marginal and may not be 
entirely due to the structure of the underlying manufacturing sector. For example, in the 
  20Central North there is a large supply of timber due to increased timber made available 
due to the mountain pine beetle infestation, and, in the Far North, alternative supplies 
from Alberta and the Yukon are available. Many mills have enough wood in their own or 
associated tenures, and this likely contributes to a lowered expected level of competition 
at auctions. The 20% take back implemented by the government will likely increase the 
expected level of competition at auctions, because firms will have to enter the market 
more frequently to supply their mills. The positive coefficient on the CVD dummy 
variable (=1 if sale occurred after latest CVD was imposed) in the number of bidders 
equation lends support to this hypothesis. Since the imposition of the countervail duty, it 
is widely known that Interior mills have increased their capacity in an attempt to drive 
unit costs down. This led to increased demand for wood and consequently more bidders 
participating in timber sale auctions.  
Many of the significant variables in the number of bidders equation correspond to 
the theoretical common values auction paradigm. Higher bid preparation costs are usually 
associated with uncertainty. This probably explains the reduced number of bidders 
associated with interior ‘wet-belt’ species such as hemlock, cedar and white pine. Stands 
in the interior wet belt have higher rates of decay and are the most diverse in the interior. 
Timber cruises in these stands are subject to higher sampling error, so bidders will 
probably conduct their own cruises. This results in higher bid preparation costs and a 
reduced number of bidders. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Hedonic timber sale, or transaction evidence appraisal, models that employ OLS 
regression often result in biased parameter estimates because of sample selectivity bias 
  21that occurs when some timber put up for auction remains unsold. In this study, a 
truncated regression model was employed to investigate stumpage bidding in the Interior 
of British Columbia. Results suggest that the current MPS model employed by the B.C. 
Ministry of Forests is biased because it uses OLS regression. This bias is consistent with 
prior expectations and likely results in overestimates of stumpage in lower-valued timber 
stands and underestimates in higher-valued stands. 
The empirical results also indicate that bidders in a timber auction behave 
strategically by shading bids, as predicted by theory. Then the high bid from auction is 
not always representative of the true value of the resource. While the degree of bid 
shading is relatively large on a per m³ basis in Fort Nelson, timber in this region makes 
up only a small portion of the annual harvest in the B.C. Interior. The bid shading in the 
remaining parts of the Northern Interior is rather insignificant on a per cubic meter basis, 
but, given that this area represents a substantial portion of the total harvest in Interior 
B.C., it represents a more significant cost to the resource owner. It is important to note, 
however, that valuations in the North are legitimately lower than those in other areas of 
the province because of higher transportation and other costs.  
Two further remarks are warranted. First, as already noted, the highest bid does 
not necessarily reflect the resource rent, because it could include quasi-rent. If auction 
results are used to set administered prices in this case, stumpage fees might be set too 
high. If quasi-rents are collected this will distort future investment and future bids at 
timber auctions. Second, the provincial government is often fixated on employment and, 
as a proxy for employment, on the amount of timber that gets harvested. Then, as 
resource owner the Province will set the amount of timber to be harvested, regardless of 
  22the actual stumpage revenue that is collected. In that case, stumpage prices and duties 
only affect the distribution of rents, but not the amount of lumber that gets produced. 
Clearly, a quantity restriction or quota on Canadian imports of softwood lumber is more 
effective than import duties in raising U.S. domestic prices.  
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1 As a result of a Canadian challenge under the WTO, the U.S. DOC indicated in early 
June 2004 that duties should be lowered from an average 27.2% to 13.2%. A few days 
later, a NAFTA panel ruled that there were no grounds for countervail duties. While $2.2 
billion in cash deposits collected from Canadian procedures is being held, no rulings on 
the ‘revised’ duties will be forthcoming until at least December 2004 (Jack p. FP3). 
2 Major licensees are those with more than 200,000 m
3 of Annual Allowable Cut. 
3 Given equation (1), the predicted latent variable does not represent maximum WTP, 
although an estimate of the maximum willingness to pay can be obtained if one controls 
for bid shading. 
4 These costs could also include wilderness and recreational benefits foregone and other 
external costs associated with harvesting, which might differ from stand to stand. 
5 The Interior is defined as the Northern and Southern Interior Forest Regions, which are 
essentially all areas east of the Cascade mountain range to the Alberta border. 
6 This specification resulted from a preliminary reduced form model that assigned 
dummy variables to each forest district. Forest districts with similar coefficients were 
then grouped together based on a series of Wald tests. The zones are: Far North, 
consisting of the Peace, Mackenzie and Ft. St. James Forest Districts; Central North, 
consisting of the Prince George, Vanderhoof and Nadina Forest Districts; South-central 
North, consisting of the Kalum, Kispiox and Bulkley-Cassiar Forest Districts; and the 
Fort Nelson Forest District.  
7 The calculation is: 380 km at 100 km/hr = 3.8 hrs×2 = 7.6 hour cycle time. Given the 
structural coefficient for cycle is 1.96, the transportation cost is 7.6×1.96 = $14.90/m³. 
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Figure 1: Difference between Predicted Unconditional and Conditional High Bids  
  28Table 1: Estimation Results for Exogenous Number of Bidders: Dependent Variable 
is Bid Amount 
 Explanatory Variable  Estimated Coefficient Standard Error  Probability 
Intercept 18.566 6.880  0.007
CVD dummy (=1 if sale offered 
after latest CVD, else 0) 
-6.346 1.078 0.000
Lumber selling price index ($/m³)  0.288 0.024 0.000
Development cost of sale ($/m
3)  -0.678 0.193 0.000
% of sale classified as blowdown   -11.778 3.508 0.001
% of sale logged by helicopter   -42.553 3.929 0.000
% of sale logged by horse   -12.262 2.687 0.000
% of sale with fire damage   -19.186 5.598 0.001
% of the gross sale retained  -1.183 2.053 0.565
Slope of site  0.306 0.102  0.003
Slope of site squared  -0.008 0.002  0.000
Truck hauling time (hours)  -1.756 0.229 0.000
Salvage (=1 if salvage sale, else 0)  -1.411 1.480 0.340
% western red cedar  8.015 3.797 0.035
% Douglas fir  4.889 2.340  0.037
% white pine  45.258 13.411  0.001
% hemlock and/or balsam  -6.890 2.658  0.010
Cruise volume of sale (m
3/ha)  0.004 0.004 0.398
Log of net cruise volume  1.933 0.659 0.003
Log of average net cruise volume per 
tree 
8.465 1.019 0.000
=1 if timber sale in 2
nd Quarter, else 0  0.949 0.882  0.282
Fort Nelson region  -9.011 7.128  0.206
Far North region  -9.203 1.350  0.000
Central North region  -4.768 1.100  0.000
South-central North region  -0.454 2.124  0.831
=1 if number of bidders = 1, else 0  -26.558 2.798  0.000
=1 if number of bidders = 2, else 0  -15.915 1.748  0.000
=1 if number of bidders = 3, else 0  -12.760 1.645  0.000
=1 if number of bidders = 4, else 0  -7.442 1.528  0.000
=1 if number of bidders = 5, else 0  -6.900 1.573  0.000
=1 if number of bidders = 6, else 0  -5.637 1.760  0.001
=1 if number of bidders = 7, else 0  -3.527 1.589  0.026
=1 if number of bidders = 8, else 0  -0.871 1.750  0.619
=1 if number of bidders = 9, else 0  0.242 1.800  0.893
=1 if number of bidders = 10, else 0  -0.649 1.962  0.741
Inverse mills ratio, λ  7.053 0.266 0.000
Adjusted R²  0.840  
 
  29Table 2: Reduced Form Bid and Number of Bidders Equations 



















*  8.435  18.505
***  5.604  1.811
***  0.455 
=1 if sale offered after 
CVD determination  
-5.213
***  1.343  -3.728
***  0.857  0.136
*  0.070 
Lumber price index  0.287
***  0.029  0.271
***  0.019 0.000  0.002 
Develop. cost ($/m
3) -0.752
***  0.236  -0.646
***  0.139 -0.006  0.011 
% classified blowdown   -8.774
**  4.384  -9.791
***  2.781 0.189  0.226 
% of sale heli logged   -58.595
*** 5.566  -39.740
*** 1.986  -0.864
***  0.161 
% of sale horse logged   -20.052
*** 3.491  -14.219
*** 1.868  -0.575
***  0.152 
% of sale w fire damage   -20.666
*** 6.772  -17.105
*** 3.742 0.097  0.304 
% of gross sale retained -9.790
***  3.165  -6.607
***  1.999  -0.380
**  0.162 
Slope of site  0.368
***  0.125  0.272
***  0.080 0.004  0.007 
Slope of site squared  -0.011
***  0.002  -0.009
***  0.001  0.000
**  0.000 
Truck haul time (hours) -2.382
***  0.280  -2.089
***  0.175  -0.040
***  0.014 
Salvage (=1, else 0)  -2.036 1.850  -2.448
**  1.246 -0.050  0.101 
% western red cedar  5.673 4.504  3.876 3.192  -0.178  0.259 
% Douglas fir  10.964
***  2.805  8.255
***  1.997  0.556
***  0.162 
% white pine  32.846
**  15.362 20.125
*  10.822 -1.876
**  0.879 
% hemlock and/or balsam  -18.894
*** 3.256  -13.485
*** 2.077  -1.064
***  0.169 
Cruise volume (m
3/ha)  0.003 0.006  0.008
**  0.004  0.001
*  0.000 
Log of cruise volume 2.109
***  0.815  1.696
***  0.540 -0.002  0.044 
Log of average net cruise 
volume per tree 
10.729
***  1.277  9.051
***  0.817  0.138
**  0.066 
=1 if timber sale in 2
nd 
Quarter, else 0  3.720
***  1.086  2.723
***  0.733  0.323
***  0.060 
Fort Nelson region  -23.320
**  9.888  -11.711
*** 3.765  -1.031
***  0.306 
Far North region  -10.671
*** 1.702  -8.590
***  1.020 -0.121  0.083 
Central North region  -7.379
***  1.378  -5.180
***  0.858  -0.217
***  0.070 
South-central North region  1.539 2.654  0.174 1.709  0.184  0.139 
λ  8.542 0.360           
Adjusted R²  0.78   0.75   0.29   
F Statistic      79.66
***    11.93
***   
a 
*** indicates statistical significance at 1% level or better, 
** at 5% level, 
* at 10% level. 
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Intercept 6.689  9.636 
Sale offered after latest CVD implemented (=1, else 0)  -6.529
** 1.583 





% of sale classified as blowdown   -11.509
* 4.672 
% of sale logged by helicopter   -48.489
** 8.193 
% of sale logged by horse   -13.794
** 4.881 
% of sale with fire damage   -20.406
** 6.709 
% of the gross sale retained  -1.758 3.273 
Slope of site  0.285
* 0.132 
Slope of site squared  -0.008
** 0.003 
Truck hauling time (hours)  -1.960
** 0.371 
Salvage (=1 if salvage sale, else 0)  -1.043 1.941 
% western red cedar  6.453 4.653 
% Douglas fir  6.112 4.049 
% white pine  54.814
* 22.925 
% hemlock and/or balsam  -7.627 7.674 
Cruise volume (m
3/ha)  0.002 0.006 
Log of net cruise volume of sale (m
3)  2.074
* 0.820 
Log of average net cruise volume per tree (m
3)  9.137
** 1.484 
=1 if timber sale in 2
nd Quarter, else 0  1.109 2.060 
Fort Nelson region  -9.021 13.362 
Far North region  -9.639
** 1.803 
Central North region  -5.614
** 1.808 
South-central North region  -0.711 2.840 
Log of forecasted expected number of bidders  12.185  7.961 
Inverse mills ratio, λ   8.593
** 0.363 
Adjusted R²  0.78   
a 
** indicates statistical significance at 1% level or better, 
* at 5% level or better. 
 